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Schmooze ticket 
Hélène Landemore 
 
[My ticket aims to provide an additional argument in favor of lotteries as an alternative 
selection method for representatives, as advocated by various “sortinitas” (including our 
very own Sandy Levinson).]  
 
Lotteries have recently been explored as an alternative to elections on many grounds: 
equality, fairness, representativeness, anti-corruption potential, protection against conflict 
and domination, avoidance of preference aggregation problems, and cost efficiency, 
among others (e.g., Elster 1989, pp. 78–103; Guerrero 2014; Mulgan 1984, pp. 539–560; 
Goodwin 1992; Carson and Martin 1999; Duxbury 1999; Leib 2004; Levinson 2012: 
124-131;  McCormick 2011; Sutherland 2004; Stone 2007, 2009, 2011; Sintomer 2007). 
To give just a few examples of the proposals for institutional reform that go with such 
reflections, Ethan Leib advocates a plan for a lottery-populated fourth branch of the US 
government, which would replace the initiative/referendum processes as a mechanism of 
popular political power. Keith Sutherland has similarly suggested having the British 
House of Commons chosen by lot. Alex Guerrero even more radically suggests giving 
full legislative power to various single-issue lottery-selected assemblies, creating a de 
facto “lottocracy” in lieu of our current representative government. More modest 
proposals, such as that by Kevin O’Leary, suggest having lottery-selected local 
assemblies that would comprise a deliberative-polling network and a People’s House, 
also selected by lottery, that would have a veto power on major legislation that passed the 
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Senate or House of Representatives.  
In this brief essay, my aim is to provide additional theoretical ammunition for the 
proponents of these various reforms aiming to reintroduce lotteries as a perfectly viable 
and legitimate democratic selection mechanism by rehearsing my own “epistemic” 
argument for the superiority of randomly selected assemblies over elected ones (see also 
Landemore 2013a and b). I argue that the superiority of randomly selected assemblies 
over elected ones is that they are more likely to be characterized by a property that has 
been shown to be essential to the problem-solving abilities of any group, namely 
cognitive diversity, or differences in the way individuals see the world and conceptualize 
and address problems in it. By contrast, elections tend to select representatives along 
homogenizing dimensions (socio-economic, racial and gender criteria in particular) that 
are bound to considerably limit cognitive diversity and thus limit the potential collective 
intelligence of the resulting assembly. To the extent that we care about the problem-
solving abilities of Congress, or whatever popular assembly we are considering, we 
would be better off switching from elections to random selection. I will also briefly 
consider two common concerns about such randomly selected alternatives: alleged lack 
of legitimacy and accountability.  
 
1. The epistemic case for randomly selected assemblies or “mini-publics.” 
My previous work has consisted in an effort to demonstrate that there is an priori 
plausible correlation between the inclusiveness of a political decision-making process, 
particularly if it is deliberative and oriented toward problem solving, and its “epistemic” 
performance, that is its ability to produce “smart” outcomes (Landemore 2012, 2013, a 
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and 2013b)1. This correlation, I have argued, is due to the fact that at least up to a point 
and under certain reasonable assumptions, including more people means introducing 
more cognitive diversity into the decision-making process, where cognitive diversity is, 
roughly, the difference in which individuals see the world and conceptualize problems in 
it, as well as a systemic property of the group that has been shown to be essential to the 
phenomenon of collective intelligence (Page 2007). According to Page’s “Diversity 
Trumps Ability theorem” indeed, cognitive diversity is more essential to the problem 
solving abilities of a group than is the other, more familiar component of collective 
intelligence, namely individual ability (Hong and Page 2004, Page 2007). In other words, 
and quite counter-intuitively, it will generally matter more for the problem-solving 
abilities of a group that it contains average people who think differently than that it 
contains really smart people who think alike.  
 While Page’s results are technically only supportive of introducing more diversity 
in the pool of decision-makers (“more diverse is smarter”), I have proposed to extend the 
conclusion towards full democratic inclusiveness (“more is smarter”). I argue that this 
generalization is justified in the political context because of the uncertainty and 
unpredictability that I argue characterize political issues.  In the absence of knowledge 
about the questions and problems that any given political group or representative 
assembly will have to address over the length of its tenure, it is equally impossible to 
know the kind of knowledge or perspectives that will be relevant and select for the right 
group composition. If what we want is to maximize cognitive diversity, the key 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By “smart” outcomes, I mean outcomes that aggregate all the relevant information and 
knowledge and, to the extent possible, track the “truth,” whether factual, political, or 
moral. 
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ingredient of collective intelligence, the best solution is thus to include everyone in the 
group. If including everyone is not an option (because deliberation then becomes 
unfeasible), the next best thing is to draw a random sample of the larger group 
(Landemore 2013a). In the context of mass democracies therefore, where direct inclusion 
of all in the decision-making process is not really an option, a random sample of the 
larger group is what we want in order to maximize the epistemic properties of the group 
of decision-makers.  
The epistemic argument for democracy—the idea that “the more, the smarter”—
thus quite naturally translates into an argument for the selection of representatives 
through lotteries. Notice that the descriptive or statistical representation that lotteries 
achieves would not elevate the level of individual ability in the assembly, as by definition 
the expected individual ability of the randomly selected individuals would be average, 
but it would reproduce in miniature the cognitive diversity of the larger group. Besides 
other possible advantages (anti-corruption effects, low cost, etc.), random selection thus 
holds the promise of an important epistemic improvement for the quality of deliberation 
among representatives.  
By contrast, from an epistemic point of view, it appears that elections wrongly 
focus on maximizing the less important ingredient of collective intelligence, namely 
individual ability, by aiming to select an elite of “best and brightest.” While nothing in 
theory precludes elections from selecting for cognitive diversity as well, the observed 
practice is that the “best and brightest” are typically selected from rather homogenous 
sociological categories (white, male, lawyers, millionaires) that are more likely than not 
to think alike on a variety of subjects. In practice, elections thus retain an aristocratic 
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flavor. Even in theory, though, it is not clear that the principle of election can be fully 
reconciled with the goal of cognitive diversity, as the persons most likely to run for office 
are likely to share some personality traits (a type-A personality, say), or other 
homogenous characteristics that may reduce the overall cognitive diversity of the 
assembly. So in theory and practice, elections can be expected to produce assemblies of 
possibly smart but rather cognitively homogenous individuals, instead of an assembly of 
cognitively diverse individuals. As a consequence, even if the average individual ability 
of the members of such elected assemblies can be high, the cognitive diversity of the 
group will not be as high as it could be and we won’t get the highest epistemic 
performance possible. 
 
2. Legitimacy 
This novel argument for sortation or lotteries over elections faces the same problems that 
competing arguments have ran into. One of them is that the randomly selected 
representatives would not have the legitimacy of elected representatives, simply in virtue 
of the fact that they were not chosen by the people on behalf of which they are supposed 
to make decision and so the crucial element of “consent” is lacking. This objection is 
typically put forward by people who distrust randomly selected mini-publics (e.g., Lafont 
2014).  
 This would be a powerful objection is the concept of political legitimacy was 
indissolubly tied to that of elections or, even more importantly, predated or mattered 
more than, democracy itself. In reality, though, the concept of legitimacy postdates by a 
few hundred years the democratic invention of randomly selected assemblies in Ancient 
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Greece (Woodruff 2006). Further, even if political legitimacy is historically tied to “the 
triumph of election” (Manin 1997), this does not establish that there is something 
essential about the connection between election and legitimacy, let alone between 
election and democracy. Elections, as a matter of fact, are not all that democratic, at least 
according to to Bernard Manin who characterizes them as “Janus-faced” (that is 
aristocratic in their elitist principle, yet democratic in the transmission of popular consent 
they supposedly ensure). By contrast, random selection, a stapple of Ancient Athens and 
later Italian republics like Venice, is arguably the more genuinely democratic procedure 
of the two. If the Anti-Federalists’ ideal of a legislature as a “mirror-image” of the 
country at large had won, we might have an easier time today reintroducing lotteries as a 
legitimate selection mechanism. 
 The concept of legitimacy invoked by advocates of election is thus a historically 
contingent one. One can imagine a more plausible concept of legitimacy, whereby 
legitimacy is a function of multiple factors, whose weight may well vary according to 
context. Some of these factors have to do with consent, some with epistemic 
performance, some with procedural fairness, some with the satisfaction of basic human 
rights etc. In any case, it certainly does not follow from the fact that elections have a 
certain kind of legitimacy, derivative essentially of consent, that random selection cannot 
have its own legitimacy, based on different and equally respectable criteria. (such as 
statistical representativeness as well as, possibly, the epistemic benefits attached to that 
property, as argued above).  
 Finally, one could also argue that random selection is not in theory inimical to 
consent per se, if consent is given to the principle of random selection itself, rather than, 
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directly, the individuals selected by the procedure. Conversely the empirical question of 
whether elections truly allow for the meaningful expression of popular consent seems to 
be more and more answered in the negative. There is thus no essential connection 
between the concept of democratic legitimacy and that of elections. We need to move 
past that false belief and open our minds to new possibilities. 
  
3. Accountability 
Another more practical objection raised against random selection is the lack of 
accountability that would arguably characterize the resulting assembly. People chosen to 
be on the assembly would not be accountable to the rest of the population, it is assumed, 
because they cannot be incentivized by the prospect of re-election to act on behalf of the 
common good rather than on that of some lobbyist willing to bribe them. Further, the 
assembly would run the risk of being composed of incompetent, perhaps morally corrupt 
people. One might remark, first, that it is dubious today whether the prospect of re-
election itself is all that efficient in ensuring accountability. 
More importantly though, one can perfectly imagine other ways of ensuring 
accountability than the incentive of re-election. Looking back to Ancient Athens, one 
thus finds that lotteries were widely used, entrusting to randomly selected citizens most 
of the functions not performed by the Popular Assembly (the Ekklesia). As Manin 
remarks (1997: 10), this suggests that Athenians thought the advantages of the procedure 
outweighed its risks and that they had found ways of guarding against its main demerits, 
including incompetence. He thus goes on to list a variety of ways in which accountability 
was ensured.  
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1) Vetting process of the randomly selected magistrates. Here is how Manin 
describes it: “Those whose names had been drawn by lot had to undergo examination 
(dokimasia) before they could take up office. This test examined whether they were 
legally qualified to be magistrates; it also checked whether their conduct towards their 
parents had been satisfactory and whether they had paid their taxes and had performed 
their military service. The test had a political side to it, too: an individual known for his 
oligarchical sympathies might be rejected. In no way, however, did dokimasia seek to 
weed out incompetents, and usually it was a mere formality.” 
2) Constant monitoring of the magistrates while in office. Here is again how 
Manin describes the accountability mechanism: “Not only did they [the magistrates] have 
to render account (euthynai) on leaving office, but during their term of office any citizen 
could at any time lay a charge against them and demand their suspension. At Principal 
Assemblies (ekklesiai kyriai), voting on the magistrates was a compulsory agenda item. 
Anyy citizen might then propose a vote of no confidence against a magistrate (whether 
appointed by lot or by election). If the magistrate lost the vote, he was immediately 
suspended and his case was referred to the courts, which then had the responsibility of 
either acquitting him (whereupon he would resume his functions) or condemning him.” 
3) Self-selection at the gate: because all these constraints and risks were common 
knowledge, only the individuals confident they would pass the various tests and be 
unlikely to face impeachments or punishment volunteered to have their names inserted 
into the lottery machine, the kleroteria. 
The first and last accountability mechanisms mentioned here are perhaps 
problematic for the epistemic argument presented above because they certainly reduce 
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the scientific representativeness of the resulting sample. That said, these mechanisms of 
accountability are just examples. One could imagine modern alternatives that would 
ensure accountability while preserving representativeness.  
Let me finally briefly rehearse a quick calculus of what a worst-case scenario 
would be like in the case of an entirely unaccountable randomly selected assembly (see 
also Landemore 2013a and 2013b: Chapter Four). The probabilities are not nearly as bad 
as critics would have us believe. Consider for example the pessimistic scenario of a 
population where 25%of the population consists of terribly incompetent and morally 
corrupt people—let us identify them as “dumb white supremacists”—and we aim to 
randomly appoint an assembly of, say, 50 representatives, to be renewed every four 
years.2  
 The first time we use the random sampling mechanism, the probability of 
drawing an assembly in which there is at least a simple majority of white supremacists 
(that is, 26 of them or more) is ridiculously low: 0.0038%. Over time, however, as we 
keep using the procedure, this probability will, as the objection points out, rise to 100%. 
This will happen, however, over an infinite amount of time. How many years would it 
take for this probability to rise not to 100% but, say, 50%? The answer is: 72,924 years. 
For the risk to go up only to 10%, we would still have to wait 11,088 years. For the risk 
to rise to 1%, it would take 1,060 years. No democracy has lived that long, and at least 
some representative democracies based on the election principle have managed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The calculus grows more unwieldy as the size of the assembly increases, hence the 
choice of that relatively low number. The point is, in any case, that it would take even 
more time for the probability of drawing a “bad” assembly consisting of several hundred 
individuals to reach any dangerous threshold so the argument that follows applies a 
fortiori to the case of most existing representative democracies, whose representative 
assemblies are generally ten times as in numerous as in the example considered here. 
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produce much worse assemblies in much shorter periods of time.  
It is true that we could be terribly unlucky and, against the odds, draw the 
dangerous assembly on the first trial or soon after. In a well-designed democracy, 
however, there should be institutional safeguards that limit the damage potentially caused 
by a particularly bad, if unlikely, draw. Constitutional checks and the existence of a 
second, non-randomly selected chamber, for example, may come to mind. While the 
objection thus raises a genuine, though highly theoretical, problem, when this problem is 
weighted against the potential and comparative benefits of random selection, it does not 
seem to be enough to justify throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
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